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Abstract
There is in man the perennial quest for freedom and self-
actualization and this lies at the root of the urge to destroy
oppressive institutions and unjust arrangements and re-
create in their places a humane society which allows for
freedom, for freedom alone is the ultimate pre-condition
for meaningful creativity. The aim of this paper, therefore,
is to carry out a critical assessment of Fanon’s violent
approach and Gandhi’s non-violent approach in colonial
situations with a view to determining whether both or
either of them are relevant to the contemporary post-
colonial situation.
Violence is other-directed, insofar as it is exercised by an already
constituted “Ego” whose interests and identity are thoroughly defined at
the onset of the process.  A liberation struggle aims not only to achieve
external objective of liberating the people from alien rule, but first and
foremost to transform the individuals who participate in it, for this guaran-
tees that the struggle will result in a new man whose humanity would be
restored. Given this, it is important to understand in what respect Fanon
and Gandhi parted ways.  We shall try to clarify the socio - historical
reasons and the value system that are at the origins of either model.
There is now a revival of interest in Frantz Fanon due to a dis-
course known as post-colonial discourse. Frantz Fanon is generally re-
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garded as one of the greatest African revolutionary theorists as well as an
irrepressible activist.  Fanon was born in the French colony of Martinique
and he grew up not just as a nationalist fighting the African cause, but also
a revolutionary and a relentless advocate for the total liberation of the
African continent.  To Fanon, liberation struggle ought not to end with
decolonization but must manifest in the well-being of the people, freed
from all forms of alienation, domination and on the whole neo-colonialism.
Before he died on 6th December 1961, at the age of thirty-six, he had
exerted a great influence on the course of the liberation struggle in Africa
and other parts of the world.
Fanon’s views on revolutionary practice are widely known for
their emphasis on violence as a sine qua non for authentic decolonization.
These views were expressed in his writings which include Black Skin,
White Mask, A Dying Colonialism, The Wretched of the Earth and
Towards the African Revolution.1  The institutionalization of violence by
the colonizer in the colonized society not only enthrones the supremacy of
the ruling class - which is also a racial category in Fanon’s analysis – but
facilitates the process of oppression and dehumanization of the colonized
people.
Now, we may ask, what does Fanon mean by violence?  The
issue of violence is an important one in Fanon’s thought.2  It is in view of
this that it becomes necessary for us to make a distinction between his
thesis that the colonial situation is an inherently violent one and his ethical
justification of violence as a potent instrument of liberation.  For as L.A.
Jinadu puts it: “Failure to make this distinction, or to emphasize it, is a
major defect in much of the discussion of the aspect of Fanon’s thought.”
One reason for this one-sided treatment of violence in Fanon, according
to Jinadu, is that much of the discussion is devoted not so much to Fanon’s
claim that the colonial situation is by definition violent as to his claim that
violence is degenerating and spiritually purifying.
What we see in Fanon is a total condemnation of the violence
inflicted on the colonized people by the colonizer.  He believes that such
violence is not conducive to the self-realization of the colonized.  He rec-
ognizes the instrumental value of violence as a means to a desirable end
when socially organized and ideologically directed to achieve the libera-
tion of the colonized.  In this sense Fanon regards violence as the praxis of
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decolonization and freedom as self - realization.
To discover what Fanon’s conception of violence in colonial situ-
ation is one need to appreciate his three-fold categorization of violence,
which helps to clarify those socio-political phenomena that in his view
constitute violence in the colonial situation.  In short, a reading from most
of works of Fanon, especially The Wretched of the Earth, suggests that
Fanon makes a distinction between physical, structural and psychological
violence and this we shall turn to presently.
Physical violence involves bodily injury inflicted on human beings,
the most radical manifestation of which is the killing of an individual. This
conception of violence as involving the killing or wounding of human be-
ings is reflected in many passages in The Wretched of the Earth.  Thus,
when Fanon claims that “colonialism…. is violence in its natural state”3
part of his meaning is that colonial rule was preceded, inaugurated and
maintained by the use of physical violence.  According to Fanon, to “pacify”
indigenous people and force them to accept the new alien order, the colo-
nizer often found it necessary to wage wars against them.  This situation
was clearly evident when indigenous people resisted the establishment of
colonial rule and violence was used to subjugate them.  It is in view of this
that Fanon advocates the use of force to liberate the colonized from the
colonizer.
Fanon deduced his advocacy of the use of physical force to re-
place the colonial situation precisely from his thesis that the colonial situa-
tion, together with the social roles and institutions that define it, rests on
the basis provided by physical violence.  As he wrote, “… it is obvious
here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force.”4
According to him, appeals to the conscience of the colonizer are, in cer-
tain contexts, misplaced and misdirected.  This is because such appeals
cannot bring about the termination of colonial rule.
Structural violence, on the other hand, is what Fanon refers to as
the Manichaeism of the colonial situation.  Used in this sense, structural
violence is a condition of social injustice.  According to Fanon, the abject
poverty of the colonized is in stark contrast to the affluence of the colo-
nizer:
The colonial world is a world divided into compartments.  It is
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probably unnecessary to recall the existence of native quarters
and European quarters, of schools for natives and schools for
Europeans: in the same way we need not recall apartheid in
South Africa.5
In Fanon’s view the purpose of colonialism, indeed the essence of
the colonial state, is the perpetuation of this condition of social injustice.
And according to Fanon, the colonizers are less concerned with bridging
the gulf that separates them from the colonized than with sapping the colony
of its economic wealth.  This assumption obviously runs counter to the
view that colonies were economically unprofitable and therefore burden-
some to the colonizer.  According to Fanon, “in every concrete way Eu-
rope has stuffed herself inordinately with the gold and raw materials of the
colonial countries.”6
The question that readily comes to mind now is the question of
whether there is any connection between physical and structural violence.
One answer to this involves yet another reference to Fanon’s belief in the
influence of socio-economic and political structures on the behavioral cal-
culus of individuals.  For example, Fanon’s thesis is also partly that struc-
tural violence as a condition of social injustice invariably drives the colo-
nized people to desperate ends and to the conviction that one way to
redress the condition is to resort to the use of physical violence.  The truth
is that the privileged position of the colonizer is envied by the colonized
who, as a result, is likely to run to radical political action to change the
situation.
In the case of psychological violence Fanon means the injury or
harm done to the human psyche.  According to Jinadu7 this includes brain-
washing, indoctrination of various kinds and threats, all of which not only
serve to decrease the victim’s mental potentialities but also constitute “vio-
lence that works on the soul.”8  In other words, this form of violence
moulds the consciousness of the colonized.  This psychological violence
represents the attempt, conscious or unconscious, by the colonizer to cre-
ate alienated colonized individuals who reject indigenous values and insti-
tutions because they are deceived or brainwashed into believing these
values and institutions are inferior to those of the colonizer.  The colonized
people, therefore, embrace the values and institutions of the colonizer and
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also “wear white masks.” Psychological violence then becomes a form of
cultural imperialism in the context of the colonial situation, and this, ac-
cording to Fanon, prevents its colonized victims from achieving self-real-
ization.  This situation becomes very pathetic when one recalls what Fanon
wrote:
In the man of color there is constant effort to run away from
his own individuality, to annihilate his own presence.9
In developing his thesis on psychological violence or psychic alien-
ation, Fanon owes much toSartre-the existentialist philosopher.  Sartre
had argued that a person, in this case the Jew, is defined by the gaze of the
Other, namely the Anti-Semite.  According to Sartre, the mistake of the
“inauthentic” Jew is to have allowed himself to be poisoned by the stereo-
type that the Other had for him.  It is in this sense that the action of the
“inauthentic” Jew is over-determined from the inside.10
It is in the same vein that Fanon says that the alienated colonized
individual accepts the stereotype view that equates Black with evil, he or
she becomes the object of the Other’s view that denies him or her of
humanity.  Fanon’s arguments, however, go further than Sartre’s in that
the Blackman experiences alienation as an individual as well as outside
himself because of his colour.
On the question of whether there is any relationship between psy-
chological and structural violence, Fanon says that the nature of the rela-
tionship is to be found in the fact that the attempt to become white reflects
the superior socio-economic and political status of the colonizer.  We may
also ask: Is there a relationship between psychological and physical vio-
lence?  Again Fanon thinks so. Some commentators on Fanon, like Jinadu,
agree with Fanon.  According to Jinadu, “His thesis is that the effective
disalienation of the Black person demands the use of physical violence,
the extent and scale of which should be viewed situationally.”11  Thus,
Fanon looks upon physical violence which, when utilized under certain
conditions and just not indiscriminately, should free the colonized from
their inferior complex and confer on them again their self-respect and
restore their humanity.
We can now pose the question: To what extent is Fanon’s three-
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fold categorization of violence useful. To Jinadu the categorization is use-
ful for heuristic purposes.  According to him, this is particularly so with the
distinction between physical and psychological violence.  It makes sense
to say that violence has been done to one’s soul or humanity in more than
a metaphorical sense.  This is an important dimension of violence in the
colonial situation and elsewhere for that matter; it focuses on all kinds of
indoctrination to which the colonizers are exposed without their necessar-
ily suffering physical or bodily harm.12
The categorization though useful for heuristic purposes, may give
rise to confusion and ambiguity when it comes to employing it for empiri-
cal purposes.  Thus, the dividing line between the three types of violence
may be a tenuous one.  For example, how do we classify action of a
government that secures compliance to its orders by threatening, without
really intending to do so, to use force to disperse a group of protesters?
Secondly, there was a glaring and abominable condition of social injustice
in the colonial situation.  The force of Fanon’s analysis of structural vio-
lence, for example, lies in his identification of, and emphasis on, its racial
basis, and on the fact that the colonizers are not responsible, that is not
accountable to the colonized, which is to say that the question of redress-
ing or equalizing the structural polarity was hardly posed.
Again, Fanon’s references to structural violence raises some in-
teresting questions about intentionality and motivation which have some
consequences.  It is one thing to claim that a structure performs certain
functions; it is another thing to say it is specifically set up to perform those
functions.  It is, therefore, not clear whether Fanon is referring to the
objective consequences of the colonial situation or to the subjective inten-
tions of the colonizer’s; or even to both.  What makes the distinctions a
useful one to make is that it is not always the case that there is congruence
between intentionality and consequences.
Fourthly, it has been argued that Fanon’s categorization makes no
distinction between violent and non-violent behavior.  Some non-violent
acts may even involve as much bodily harm or injury as violent acts.  For
example, a fast-unto–death can involve doing harm to one’s body.  Now
let us turn to Gandhi at this point.
Mahatma Gandhi is one of the foremost political philosophers
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advocating non-violent approach to liberation in a colonial situation.  After
1857 when Britain ruthlessly put down the Indian rebellion and acquired
direct control over India, many Indians began to feel that their freedom
could be attained by means of violence and that such violence was fully
justified.  Although India’s struggle for independence was largely non-
violent, it was dominated and periodically vitalized by a small but vocal
terrorist movement.  When Gandhi later appeared on the scene, he at-
tacked terrorism and justified his uncompressing insistence on non-vio-
lence.  Though Gandhi was familiar with the terrorist movement, he was
wholly unpersuaded by their arguments.  However, he was convinced that
they had a great appeal to his countrymen, and that their advocacy of
violence was likely to receive support unless their advocacy of violence
was effectively countered.
Even though Gandhi agreed with the “school of violence” that the
liberal methods of rational discussion, parliamentary opposition and elec-
toral pressure were either not available or ineffective in India, he was
convinced that violence was not the answer for two reasons.  First, vio-
lence was in principle unacceptable, and second, it was inappropriate and
undesirable in the specific context of India’s struggle for independence.
Gandhi disapproved of violence on four grounds, namely the ontological,
the epistemological, the moral and prudential.
His ontological argument is hinged on his belief that the universe is
grounded in and sustained by a Supreme Principle, which he calls Reality
or Truth and, as a concession to convention, God.  The Supreme Prin-
ciple regulates the movement of the natural world and is manifested in
living beings in the form of a soul.  Gandhi also believes that both animals
and human beings have souls; the difference between them is that the soul
of an animal is dormant and ‘unself conscious’.  All living organisms thus
embody the divine and are sacred.
For Gandhi then all men are “sons of the same God”, and ‘kith
and kin’, ‘ourselves in a different form’, and ‘ultimately one.’13 Gandhi
goes further to say that since all men are one, their relations can only be
based on love and good-will not hatred and ill-will.  According to Gandhi,
love springs from and sustains human unity, whereas hatred and ill-will are
divisive.  Now love implies care and concern for others, an active desire
to help them grow and flourish, and thus rules out violence.  Gandhi be-
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lieves that the use of violence is incongruous with man’s spiritual nature
and detracts from his dignity as a human or spiritual being.  For Gandhi,
violence ultimately rests on the assumption that some men are so fallen
that they can never be won over by love and must be destroyed by force.
In his view, these amount to denying the fundamental ontological fact about
men, namely that each of them embodies a spirit which, however deeply
buried under the thick crust of prejudices, can eventually be awakened.14
Gandhi also advances an epistemology argument against violence.
The argument is that the use of violence implies a belief in the absolute and
infallible knowledge.  That in order to be justified in taking the extreme
step of harming or killing someone, one must assume that one’s objectives
are absolutely right, violence will definitely achieve them and that one’s
opponent is totally mistaken.  That the consequences of violence are irre-
versible in the sense that a life once terminated or damaged can never be
revived or easily put together.  And irreversible deeds require infallible
knowledge to justify them.  For Gandhi such infallible moral and empirical
knowledge is denied to man.  To Gandhi fallibility of man undermines the
very basis of action, for a man can never act if he constantly entertains
doubt that his objectives might be wholly wrong.  We must, therefore,
acknowledge our fallibility and leave room for reflection and reconsidera-
tion, a sort of reflective equilibrium, to use Rawls’s phrase.  In his view,
violence does not allow this.  It generates bitterness which ‘blurs our vi-
sion’ and prevents us from appreciating the opponent’s point of view.  For
Gandhi then violence is doubly flawed; it assumes infallibility and rules out
corrigibility.
Gandhi also bases his rejection of violence on moral grounds.
For him, morality consists, not merely in doing what is right, but doing so
because one believes it to be right.  For Gandhi, therefore, morality re-
quires the unity of character and conduct, harmony between belief and
behavior.  In his view violent disrupts this unity.  By creating a split be-
tween belief and character on the one hand and conduct on the other,
violence undermines a person’s moral integrity and diminishes his status as
a moral being.
Finally, Gandhi rejects violence on the ground that it can never
achieve lasting results.  According to him, when we describe a particular
act of violence as successful, we mean that it has achieved a specific
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objective.  Judged within the context of this narrow framework, the act of
violence has no doubt been successful.  Gandhi contends that if we are to
view it in terms of its long term consequences and the kind of society it
creates, our judgment would be very different.  Its apparent success en-
courages the belief that violence succeeds and it alone succeeds, and it
develops that habit of using it every time when one runs into resistance.
Gandhi also claims that violence has a habit of generating a vicious spiral.
With every apparently successful act of violence, the community con-
cerned comes to accept it as inevitable and becomes used to it.  Its toler-
ance of violence increases, and overtime an increasingly larger amount of
it becomes necessary to achieve the same objective.  According to Gandhi,
each act of violence adds to an escalating spiral and contributes to the
eventual disintegration of the community from which no one benefits.  It
may also become part and parcel of the society after independence might
have been achieved.
As we have noted, Gandhi not only objected to the use of vio-
lence in general, but also in the specific context of India’s independence
struggle. For him independence means absence of foreign rule; and if it
involves nothing more than replacing the foreign with indigenous masters
and exploiters, it does not make a significant improvement and is hardly
worth dying for.  In Gandhi’s view Indian independence is desirable to
arrest the utter moral degradation of the colonized by the colonizer and to
educate the colonized against accepting an alien civilization being forced
on them by the colonizer.
For Gandhi then, independence is necessary for the regeneration
of the Indian character and civilization.  He subsumes both these under the
concept of swaraj.  Swaraj which means self-rule or self-government
implies a form of polity in which self-disciplined and ‘manly’ people con-
duct their personal and collective affairs.  According to Gandhi, indepen-
dence is merely legal and political, whereas swaraj is a moral concept
referring to the quality of the character and civilization of a community.  He
believes that independence can be given, swaraj can only be won; inde-
pendence can be a gift, swaraj is an achievement; independence is essen-
tially negative, swaraj is positive.
In Gandhi’s view then, the struggle for independence cannot be
dissociated from the far more important struggle for swaraj.  Since inde-
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pendence is only desirable as a condition of ‘swaraj’ the struggle for it
must be organized that it facilitates the achievement of swaraj, for other-
wise independence would only lead to the rule by arrogant minority just as
keen as their colonial predecessors to keep their subjects ‘unmanly’ and
just as out of sympathy with the indigenous civilization.
Violence, in Gandhi’s view, is by its very nature confined to a few
and does not actively involve the vast masses of men.  It is thus elitist in
orientation, encourages the cult of leadership and likely to do little more
than replace the British with a small minority of indigenous rulers.  Further,
since the masses are not actively involved, the violent struggle for inde-
pendence cannot arrest their moral degrading, let alone develop ‘manly’
qualities in them.  Nor can it generate a sense of community based on
solidarity of suffering, and the consequent sense of having a stake in politi-
cal power.
For Gandhi then, violence was not a proper method of struggle
against the British.  It was morally undesirable, incapable of achieving
swaraj and, given the enormous disparity in the instruments of violence at
the disposal of the government and the people, unlikely to achieve inde-
pendence either.  Gandhi then went on to propose an alternative method
which, he claimed, was in accord with man’s spiritual nature and sure to
achieve both swaraj and independence.  He called this method
satyagraha.  It required that the goals of struggle should be just or truth-
ful, and those engaged in it guided by love for and desire to ‘convert’ their
opponents by patiently suffering whatever punishment was meted out to
them.  Gandhi developed several forms of action which collectively con-
stitute his method of satyagraha.  Of these, non-cooperation, civil dis-
obedience and fast were the most important.
Gandhi’s view is that a government cannot exist and operate suc-
cessfully without the cooperation of the subjects.  This is because the
authority of any government draws its base from the subjects, that is their
consent is necessary.  It is the moral responsibility of the subjects to refuse
to co-operate with the government is if it is unjust.  In Gandhi’s view, non-
cooperation can take many forms which include among others refusal to
serve in the armed forces, boycotting of schools and surrendering of hon-
ors and titles conferred by the government.
The refusal to obey the laws of the government is also a form of
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non-cooperation, and this leads to civil disobedience.  According to Gandhi,
civil disobedience means an open, peaceful, principled and courteous vio-
lation of laws believed to be unjust.  Civil disobedience, Gandhi claims,
can “bring the whole legislative and executive machinery to a stand-still.”15
In addition to the methods of civil disobedience and non-cooperation is
the method of fasting.  According to Gandhi, fast –unto-death was an
expression of courage at an evil practice, and it was also a last desperate
attempt to stir the ‘sluggish conscience’ of his opponent.  He does not
believe that fast was a cowardly suicide, nor a quasi-Romantic gesture of
self-immolation, but an act of martyrdom for a cause.
Having outlined Gandhi’s critique of violence and his alternative
theory of satyagraha we are now in a position to ask: To what extent are
his arguments tenable?  In fact many criticisms have been raised against
Gandhi.  One line of criticism, for example, against his position is his at-
tempt to link swaraj with the rejection of industrial civilization which is
considered as anachronistic.  He is wrong to suggest that violence is es-
sentially Western and that India civilization is basically non-violent.  Again,
Gandhi fails to appreciate the fact that the struggles for independence and
swaraj are rather different in nature, cannot be easily integrated and that
his attempts to combine them lead to confusion and lack of direction.  His
belief that violence somehow remains confined to a few terrorists and
does not require the more or less active support of the community at
large, and that non-violent struggle avoids elitism, are also mistaken.
Apart from the above criticisms raised against Gandhi’s critique
of violence, his own alternative theory of non-violence or satyagraha
suffers from other severe limitations. First, he was wrong to regard vio-
lence as a carnal and non-violence as spiritual in nature.  Second, it could
be argued that he exaggerated the difference between non-violence and
violence.  Third, he failed to fully appreciate the nature and role of vio-
lence in human affairs.  And finally, although he did not intend it, his theory
of satyagraha tended to glorify suffering.
There is necessarily a sense in which political thinkers are prod-
ucts of their social milieu.   Their thoughts and writings are
profoundly affected by the complex nature of the various so-
cial influences and forces to which they are exposed and sub-
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jected.16
In the case of Fanon, his theory of violence in colonial situation
was rooted in the socio-economic and political milieu created by French
colonial rule in Martinique and Algeria.  The theory of French colonial
rule, reflected in the French colonial policies of assimilation and associa-
tion, is based primarily on the assumption of the superiority of French
culture and civilization, an assumption that rests on the denial of the au-
thenticity of indigenous culture.
Fanon’s experiences in Martinique and France pointed to the gap
between the theory and practice of assimilation.  Although he had ‘assimi-
lated’ French values in Martinique, he discovered in Martinique and France
that colonialist society was a rigidly stratified or racist society in which the
color question was an overriding one that precluded his admission to, and
mobility within, French society on equal socio-economic and political terms
with white Frenchmen, despite the fact that one puts on white mask though
having black skin..
The portrait of Fanon that should emerge is that of a moralist and
humanist.  He had a passionate concern for, and commitment to, humanity
and the human condition; he felt uneasy in a hypocritical world where lip
service was paid to the ideals of social justice, equality and freedom.  He
brought moral concerns to bear on the social and political questions.  Gandhi
also was a humanist.  He felt for his people’s subjugated condition.  He
had the feeling that India’s rich civilization was not allowed to flourish
during the colonial period.  His discourse on non-violence relied on the
rich heritage of India though he tapped from other cultures, especially the
western culture which he was familiar with.  He was able to innovate
Indian culture through his vast knowledge of it which he combined with
other cultures, and he formed an integrated discursive strategy on non-
violence.
Fanon’s position is best understood when contrasted with
Gandhi’s, which presents us with an opposite model of anti-colonial
struggle.  For Gandhi did not approach the question of liberation from the
viewpoint of a population dispossessed, but from the view point of a na-
tion endowed with a rich cultural heritage and a unique civilizing mission in
the world. Gandhi was always inspired by a deep sense of national and
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personal value as well as the belief that the mind has primacy over the
body and the individual can achieve inner freedom in the face of all exter-
nal constraints.  Thus, he was convinced that India’s culture embodied
universal values, that, once realized, should provide a source of strength,
a “soul force” for its masses, and become a key element in their emanci-
pation.  Gandhi was also influenced by the Hindu creed that life in the
body is an imperfect status from which only death can liberate us.  Not
only is the individual a battlefield of two opposite natures: higher self-
eternal, imperishable, and a lower self caught in the life-death cycle.  As
life in the flesh is a chain which binds us to our essential freedom, the aim
of our existence is to overcome the body and manifest in the course of
history, our true, divine nature.17
From this conception of the self and national identity - where
selfhood and India’s honor are deeply intertwined - stems both Gandhi’s
rejection of violence and his doctrine of satyagraha, which he first devel-
oped in South Africa in the course of his long campaign for Indian rights.
The two models of violence have had a lasting impact on the
struggles of people of the Third World countries.  Besides, both Fanon’s
and Gandhi’s positions still continue to have an impact in the socio-eco-
nomic political landscapes of African countries and India.  Violence has
become part and parcel of African political system, where the violent struc-
tures of colonial system are still being used by the African elites against
their people.  The African elites have turned the state into a personal
fiefdom.18  African psyche is still affected by the historical encounter with
the West.  Gandhi’s romanization of suffering as a means of political change
has had an impact on the psyche of his countrymen. Suffering has become
so much a part of life that death and misery no longer arouse any response
in people.  People have turned suffering into a ritual, a cult in that part of
the world and despite the recent economic growth of India, majority of
the people are still wallowing in poverty.  There is still large scale poverty
in India that it is unimaginable considering the economic growth that is
highly enormous and has not transformed the life of the ordinary people in
all areas of their life.  There is class stratification now and the gap between
the elite and the poor has widened greatly.  This situation has not made the
majority to be conscious of the need to change it because, as earlier pointed,
suffering has become part and parcel of the normal life in that part of the
96  Prajñâ Vihâra
world.19  Gandhi’s theory has had this kind of effect on the people in that
they do not think that the system can be changed.  In a nutshell, the two
models still continue to have an impact and here lies their relevance to the
post-colonial situation.*
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